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LONG BEACH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
v. DOROTHY B. GODWIN LNING TRUST, ET 
AL., AND MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, 
POWERINE OIL COMPANY: DETERMINING 
THE SCOPE OF EASEMENT HOLDER 
LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin 
California Living Trust,l the Ninth Circuit held that the hold-
er of an easement burdening land which contains a hazardous 
waste facility is not, by virtue of that interest alone, liable for 
cleanup costs as an "owner or operator" under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
(hereinafter "CERCLA,,).2 The court reasoned that under com-
mon principles of property law, easement holders have a limit-
ed right to use the land of another but do not own the land 
itself, and therefore, should not be considered owners for the 
purposes of CERCLA liability.3 
1. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 
F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994) (per Kozinski, J., with whom Trott, J., and Williams, J., 
joined). This is a case of first impression for any federal circuit court. 
2. Long Beach, 32 F.3d 1364. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 
1993). This section is entitled the Comprehensive Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980. 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The property at issue in this case was bought by the Long 
Beach Unified School District (hereinafter "School District") 
from the Dorothy B. Godwin Living Trust and the Grover 
Godwin California Trust (hereinafter, collectively, "the Trusts") 
in October, 1987.4 The land had previously been leased by the 
Schafer Brothers Transfer and Piano Moving Company (herein-
after "Schafer Bros.")., which had built and operated a waste 
pit on the land for ten years.5 The waste pit was used by 
Schafer Bros. for the illegal disposal of hazardous waste.6 
The land is subject to easements held by Mobil Oil Corpo-
ration and Powerine Company (hereinafter, collectively, 
"M&P,,).7 The Mobil easement, which was granted prior to 
1971,8 gave Mobil the rights to lay, operate, and maintain 
pipelines through the parcel,9 and to request the owner of the 
land to remove structures or improvements that interfered 
with the use of the easement.10 In April 1971, Mobil assigned 
a portion of the easement to Powerine for a single line of 
pipe. ll The owner of the land retained the right to build on 
and otherwise use the land burdened by the easements, subject 
to M&P's use of the easements.12 
A site assessment performed by the Trusts before the sale 
was consummated revealed that the property was contaminat-
ed with petroleum and chlorinated hydrocarbons from the 
waste pit left by Schafer Bros.13 The waste pit was located on 
4. Appellees' Joint Brief at 2, Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. 
Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-56562). 
5. Id. 
6. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Long Beach Unified 8ch. Dist. v. Dorothy 
B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-56562). 
7. Long Beach Unified 8ch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 
F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994). 
8. Appellees' Joint Brief at 3, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). Mobil was granted 
the easement by Angelo Gaspare and A.J. Land Company, an owner of the proper-
ty prior to the Trusts. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 4. 
11. Id. at 3. 
12. Appellees' Joint Brief at 6, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). 
13. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). 
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the portion of the property burdened by the easements.14 The 
Trusts estimated that it would cost a maximum of $249,000 to 
remove the hazardous waste and decontaminate the proper-
ty.15 Therefore, as a condition of sale, the Trusts put $250,000 
in escrow for clean up costS.16 However, the entire escrow 
fund was exhausted by the investigation and expert evaluation 
of the site, and no money was left for the actual cleanup.17 
On September 5, 1991, the School District filed a com-
plaint for recovery of the remaining response costs under 
CERCLA against the Trusts, Schafer Bros., and M&P.18 The 
Trusts and Schafer Bros. settled with the School District and 
agreed to pay a substantial share of the cleanup costS.19 The 
case continued against M&P.20 The School District did not 
allege that M&P polluted the property or even knew or had 
reason to know of the waste pit.21 Rather, the School District 
claimed that M&P's status as easement holders qualified them 
as "owners" or "operators" under 42 U.S.C. § 9607.22 The dis-
trict court granted M&P's 12(b)(6) motion23 to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.24 
The School District appealed to the United States Court of 
14. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. 
15. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). 
16. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. 
17. [d. 
18. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). The School 
District also stated claims under California nuisance law in its complaint. The 
School District did not appeal the district court's dismissal of the state law claims. 
Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366 n.l. 
19. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. Under the settlement agreement the Trusts 
assumed the bulk of the past remediation and costs and Schafer Bros. agreed to 
assume the responsibility for future cleanup activities. Appellees' Joint Brief at 3, 
Long Beach (No. 92-56562). 
20. Long Beach, 32 F.3d 1366. 
2l. [d. 
22. [d. M&P's liability as "owners and operators" is discussed in section III.B. 
See infra notes 39-66 and accompanying text. 
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
24. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. M&P asserted in their motions that (1) 
easement holders are not "owners" for the purposes of CERCLA and (2) 
the CERCLA third party defense barred the claims against M&P because 
the contamination was caused by a third party unconnected to Mobil or 
Powerine. Appellees' Joint Brief at 2, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). The second 
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.25 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit set the groundwork for its analysis by 
evaluating the scope of CERCLA liability.26 CERCLA has 
been read as a strict liability statute,27 has been applied ret-
roactively,28 and has been used by plaintiffs to "pierce the cor-
porate veil. "29 However, the court concluded that although 
CERCLA liability is very broad, it is not unlimited.30 
A. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERCLA LIABILITY 
The court determined that in order to recover under 
CERCLA, the School District must show that (1) there was a 
"release" or "threatened release,,31 of a hazardous substance 
25. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. 
26. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living 
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994). 
27. [d. (citing General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 
Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that CERCLA is a strict 
liability statute, with only a limited number of statutorily defined defens-
es available); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 n.ll (4th 
Cir. 1988) (agreeing with "overwhelming body of precedent" interpreting 
CERCLA as establishing a strict liability scheme); New York v. Shore Real-
ty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d. Cir. 1985) (holding that CERCLA unequivo-
cally imposes strict liability without regard to causation». 
28. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. See United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Although 
CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is manifestly 
clear that Congress intended CERCLA to have a retroactive effect."); see 
also United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D.Colo. 1985) 
(congressional intent was to hold responsible parties liable for pre-enact-
ment response costs). 
29. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. See United States v. Carolina Trans-
former Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1036-38 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (corporation's former 
president, chairman of board, and director held jointly and severally lia-
ble as "owner/operator" of corporation's facility at which hazardous sub-
stances had been released). But see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 
F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to pierce the corporate veil to reach the 
parent company). 
30. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. 
31. Under CERCLA, "[t)he term 'release' means any spilling, leaking, 
pumping. pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leach-
ing, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment 
or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles contain-
4
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from the site; (2) the site is a "facility;"32 (3) the release 
caused the School District to incur cleanup costs;33 and (4) 
M&P fall within one of four classes of responsible parties un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).34 There was no dispute that the site 
ing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) ., .. " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(22) (1988). 
The language of section 107(a) requires only that there be a threat, 
not an actual release. See Alfred R. Light, CERCLA Law and Procedure § 
4.2.1 69 (Bureau of National Affairs 1991). Plaintiff must at least allege 
such a threat in order to state a claim. Id. (citing New York v. Shore 
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985». Evidence of the presence 
of hazardous substances at the facility when combined with the unwilling-
ness of any party to assert control over the substance amounts to a 
threat of release. United States v. Northemaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 
742, 746-47 (W.D. Mich. 1987), affd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer, 
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.1057 (1990). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) defines the term "facility" as: 
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, 
pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or 
publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, 
lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage con-
tainer, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or 
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance 
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or 
otherwise came to be located. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). 
33. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1367. A person who pays for the cleanup of 
a hazardous waste facility is entitled to recover from liable parties 
"any . .. necessary costs of response . .. not inconsistent with the nation-
al contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
The National Contingency Plan [hereinafter "NCP"I, 40 C.F.R. § 300 
(1994) was originally prepared to implement section 311 of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (Supp. V 1993). Section 105 
of CERCLA directed the revision of the NCP to establish more comprehen-
sive procedures for responding to releases of hazardous substances pol-
lutants and contaminants. 42 U.S.C. § 9605. 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 9607(a) provides that: 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any 
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility 
at which such hazardous substances were disposed 
of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or 
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment... 
or arranged... for transport for disposal or 
treatment of hazardous substances... (4) any per-
son who accepts or accepted any hazardous waste 
for transport to disposal or treatment . facilities . . . 
from which there is a release or threatened release which 
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous 
substance shall be liable . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added). 
5
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was a "facility," that there was a release of a hazardous sub-
stance, or that this release caused M&P to incur cleanup 
costS.35 The School District did not allege that M&P were in-
volved in generating, arranging, or transporting the hazardous 
waste.36 The sole issue was whether M&P, as easement hold-
ers, could be liable as "owners and operators" of a hazardous 
waste facility.37 
B. LIABILITY As "OWNER AND OPERATOR" 
The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of other courts 
and read the terms "owner and operator" in the disjunctive.38 
A party may be liable as either an "owner" or an "operator," or 
both.39 The School District argued that as easement holders, 
M&P were liable as both owners and operators of the facili-
ty.40 The School District reasoned that the term "owner" as 
used in CERCLA is not limited to persons who hold title in fee 
simple, but rather refers to any person holding "indicia of own-
ership.,,41 
The italicized phrase appears in only one of the four paragraphs 
identifying potentially liable persons in the statute, but courts consider 
the unusual sectioning of the provision a "printer's error" and apply the 
liability threshold to all four categories. See, e.g., Bryant v. Colonial 
Pipeline Co., 699 F. Supp. 546, 548 (W.O. Va. 1987) (holding that the liability 
threshold is applicable to all four categories). 
35. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Goodwin Cal. Living 
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366-67. 
36. Id. at 1367. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. (citing United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 
n.3 (11th Cir. 1990); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 
849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. 
Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.O. Pa. 1989); Artesian Water Co. v. Government 
of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280-81 (D.De\. 1987), affd, 851 
F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. 
Supp. 573, 578 <D.Md. 1986». 
39. Id. 
40. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). The School 
District did not distinguish between liability as an owner and as an opera-
tor in its brief. Id. at 6-18. 
41. Id. at 6. 
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1. Although An Easement Holder Can Be Liable As An "Opera-
tor" Under CERCLA, M&P Do Not Qualify As Operators 
The Ninth Circuit found that while an easement holder 
can sometimes be the "operator" of a hazardous waste facility, 
M&P did not fit within this definition.42 The court stated that 
to be an "operator" of a hazardous waste facility a party must 
play an active role in running the facility, usually involving 
day to day participation in the facility's management.43 Since 
pipelines are expressly included in the definition "facility,"44 
an easement holder would be liable for owning a pipeline from 
which a hazardous substance was leaking, if all of the other 
elements were met.45 The School District, however, did not 
allege that M&P's pipelines leaked.46 The School District 
merely alleged that since M&Ps pipelines crossed the proper-
ty, M&P were in a position to prevent the contamination.47 
The court noted that an easement holder would be hard press-
es to stop any pollution she might discover since she would 
have no control over the property beyond preventing interfer-
ence with the easement.46 Therefore, the court concluded that 
42. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1367. 
43. [d. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber v. Vulcan Material Co., 861 F.2d 
155, 157-58 (7th Cir. 1988) (Supplier is not operator because he cannot con-
trol work at plant, choose employees, direct their activities or set prices. 
A limited veto, in and of itself is not enough to make him an operator); 
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (defen-
dant "is in charge of the operation of the facility in question, and as 
such is an operator within the meaning of CERCLA"). Cf, In re Bergsoe 
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990) (secured creditor not liable 
under section 9601(20)(A) unless he engages in "some actual management"); 
40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (EPA rule indicating that secured lenders are only 
liable if they actually participate in facility's management). 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988). See supra note 33 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 
9601(9). 
45. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1367. In this situation the easement holder 
might also be liable as an arranger or transporter under sections 
9607(a)(3) and (a)(4). See supra note 35 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The 
court did not reach the closer question of an easement holder's potential 
liability as an operator when he leases his right to lease the land to 
someone else, who then operates a leaking pipe. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1367 
n.3. 
46. [d. at 1367. 
47. [d. The School District alleged that M&P had the ability to moni-
tor and control the facility and to notify the authorities of the disposal. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). 
48. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369 n.6. 
7
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M&P could not be liable as operators under CERCLA because 
M&P did not have any control over the facility or the ability to 
prevent the release.49 
2. Holding An Easement Is An Insufficient Basis For Liability 
As An "Owner" Under CERCLA 
The School District argued that as easement holders M&P 
were liable as "owners" of the facility.50 The statutory defini-
tion of "owner or operator" merely repeats the operative 
terms,51 defining "owner and operator" as "any person owning 
or operating" a facility.52 The court found that the circularity 
of this definition "strongly implies ... that the statutory terms 
have their ordinary meanings rather than unusual or technical 
meanings. "53 Therefore, the court read the statute as incorpo-
rating the ordinary common law definitions of its terms. 54 
The court found that under the common law, an easement 
holder is not viewed as the owner of the .land burdened by the 
easement. 55 Although an easement is an interest in land, it is 
49. [d. at 1368. 
50. [d. 
51. Appellees Joint Brief at 5, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a). 
53. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368 (citing Edward Hines Lumber Co., 861 F.2d 
at 156) (Congress intended courts to turn to common law analogies to 
. define CERCLA's terms). See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 
1960, 1966-68 (1994) (construing statutory term "enforcement activities" ac-
cording to its plain meaning); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.s. 1, 9-
11 (1989) (relying on a "cascade of plain language"); Cadillac 
Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1988) (re-
fusing to imply private right of injunctive relief based on plain language 
of CERCLA). 
54. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368. An "owner" is the "person in whom is 
vested the ownership, dominion, or title of property; proprietor." BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 764 (6th ed. 1990). "Ownership" is the "collection of rights 
to use and enjoy property, including right to transmit it to others. The 
complete dominion, title or proprietary right in a thing or claim. The en-
tirety of the powers of use and disposal allowed by law." [d. at 765. 
55. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368. For other cases supporting this holding, 
see Robinson v. Cuneo, 290 P.2d 656, 658 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (refusing 
to construe easement to prohibit owner of land from using area of ease-
ment because, unlike owner, easement holder "owns no part of the land 
itself and has no right to exclude the owner from the use of any of the 
land, except insofar as a use interferes with his easement rights"); Henry 
Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 336 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Ky. 1960) 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/11
1995] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 201 
only "a limited use or enjoyment of the land in which the inter-
est exists,... it is not itself either land or an estate in 
land."56 The court found the distinction between ownership of 
an easement and ownership of the burdened land to be well 
established. 57 Therefore, the court found no common law basis 
for finding that easement holders are owners for purposes of 
CERCLA liability. 58 
The court also found that public policy supported this 
reading of the statute.59 Numerous types of easements encum-
ber land titles throughout the United States.GO Easements 
establish a variety of rights ranging from the running of utility 
poles to overflight, use of a swimming pool and scenic ease-
ments.61 The court held that to subject all easement holders 
to CERCLA liability would be contrary to the policy behind the 
statute, which strives to impose the costs of cleanup on those 
responsible for the contamination.62 The court further noted 
that finding easement holders to be owners for the purposes of 
CERCLA liability would unjustifiably expand the number of 
potential CERCLA defendants to include "many non-polluting 
actors with no greater responsibility for the nation's toxic 
waste problem than the general public.,,63 The court also con-
(easement holder is not an "owner" of land); Weeks v. Texas lllinois Natu-
ral Gas Pipeline Co., 276 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. 1955) (easement holder did 
not have possessory interest or any right in property beyond the limits of 
right to lay and maintain pipeline and therefore could not be held liable 
for waste). 
56. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368 (quoting City of Hayward v. Mohr, 325 
P.2d 209, 214 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958». 
57. [d. 
58. [d. at 1368-69. Although the court deemed a defendant's status as 
an "owner" under the common law as necessary to being an "owner" under 
CERCLA, they did not consider whether it is sufficient. [d. at 1369 n.5. 
59. [d. at 1369. 
60. [d. 
61. [d. (citing OLIN BROWDER ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAw 514-95 (5th ed. 
1989)). 
62. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 
U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. 
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.Minn. 1982) ("Congress intended that those responsible 
for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs 
and responsibility for remedying the harmful condition they created."). 
63. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369. Among these non-polluting actors are 
utilities with easements to run pipelines and cables. The court found that 
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eluded that to expand liability to include easement holders 
would serve no purpose beyond providing a deep pocket from 
which to recover response costs.64 Therefore, in the absence of 
a clearer expression from the legislature imposing liability on 
easement holders, the court refused to construe the term "own-
er" to include easement holders.65 
3. The Lender Liability Provision Of CERCLA Does Not 
Expand The Definition Of Owner To Encompass Easement 
Holders 
The School District also asked the court to interpret the 
term "owner" to include any person holding "indicia of owner-
ship.,,66 Section 9601(20)(a) of CERCLA excludes from the 
definition of owner "a person who without participating in the 
management of a vessel or facility holds indicia of ownership 
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.n67 The 
School District reasoned that anyone who holds "indicia of 
ownership" for any reason other than to protect a security 
interest is therefore an "owner.,,68 They further argued that 
M&P's easement constituted "indicia of ownership" held for 
reasons other than protection of a security interest and that 
therefore M&P should be liable under CERCLA.69 
The court reasoned that this clause was included in 
CERCLA to resolve only the narrow issue of non-managing 
64. Id. at 1369 n.6. One commentator has advocated ownership liability 
for easement holders, suggesting that they could provide useful monitor-
ing of hazardous waste disposal. See Jill D. Neiman, Note, Easement Holder 
Liability Under CERCLA: The Right Way to Deal with Rights·of·Way, 89 MICH. L. 
REv. 1233 (1991). But see Melissa A. McGonigal, Comment, Extended Liability 
Under CERCLA: Easement Holders and the Scope of Control, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 
992, 1022 (1993) ("easement holders would not make efficient or competent 
monitors"). 
65. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369. 
66.Id. 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a). 
68. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369. 
69. Id. In its brief, the School District ignored the regulatory defini· 
tion of the term "indicia of ownership." The definition includes a long list 
of security interests such as mortgages and deeds of trust, but does not 
include interests such as easements, which have nothing to do with fi· 
nancing real estate transactions. Appellees' Joint Brief at 12, Long Beach 
(No.92·56562) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 3001.1100(a». 
10
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lenders' liability.70 The court also noted that the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, in issuing a rule construing the clause, 
did not draw the broad negative inference urged by the School 
District.71 The court therefore refused to find that this clause 
was intended by Congress to impose liability on easement 
holders and anyone else holding an interest in land containing 
a toxic waste facility, without an examination of the nature 
and extent of the interest.72 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In order to be liable as an "owner" of a hazardous waste 
facility under CERCLA, the defendant must be an owner under 
the common law. Under the common law an easement holder 
is not viewed as the owner of the land burdened by the ease-
ment. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that M&P could not 
be liable based on their status as easement holders alone.73 
Although an easement holder can be held liable as an 
"operator" of a hazardous waste facility, M&P did not qualify 
because they did not have any active control over nor partici-
pate in the management of the facility. Easement holder liabil-
ity in the absence of common law ownership therefore hinges 
on the degree of participation in the facility's management. 
As non-participating holders of easements burdening land 
containing a hazardous waste facility, M&P cannot be held 
70. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369. This narrow issue has prompted dis-
agreement among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal. Compare 
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1990) ("actual 
management unnecessary for secured creditor liability") with In re Bergsoe 
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (some actual management is neces-
sary for a secured creditor to be liable). 
71. 1d. at 1369-70. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (Environmental Protection 
Agency rule indicating that secured creditors are liable only if they en-
gage in actual participation in the facility's management). 
72. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369-70. 
73. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living 
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir. 1994). This holding was followed in 
Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. v. Acme Belt Recoating, Inc., 859 F. 
Supp. 1125 (W.O. Mich. 1994) (owner or operator of a loading dock on land 
not belonging to it, but over which it holds an easement for ingress and 
egress, cannot be found liable on that basis alone). 
11
Poppe: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
204 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:193 
liable for cleanup costs as either "owners" or "operators" under 
CERCLA. 
Heidi P. Poppe * 
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